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Although elderly Americans are better able to pay for medical care than ever 
before, there is a widespread perception that financing the health care of the 
elderly will pose a tremendous challenge to policymakers in the United States 
during the coming decades. The elderly have more comprehensive protection 
against the financial burden of  paying for hospital and physicians’ services 
than other segments of the population; more than 13 percent of all Americans 
lack health insurance, but only six-tenths of  1 percent of  Americans 65 and 
older are uninsured (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989,96). The great majority 
participate in at least one of the two government programs that finance health 
care for the elderly, Medicare and the need-based Medicaid program. About 
two-thirds of the elderly purchase supplemental private insurance as well. Even 
as the  elderly  enjoy more comprehensive medical insurance than  younger 
Americans, their well-being has improved absolutely and in relation to other 
demographic groups. For example, between 1970 and 1984, median incomes 
for families headed by 25-64-year-olds  barely changed, rising from $29,113 
to $29,292 (in  1984 dollars). During the same period, median incomes for 
families headed by  persons 65 years of  age or older rose from $13,522 to 
$18,236 (U.S. Senate Special Committee on  Aging  1986, 57). Why,  then, 
speak of a crisis in financing the health care of the elderly? 
The challenge lies in the observation that government expenditures for the 
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health care of the elderly are rising rapidly, yet  the elderly continue to risk 
catastrophic health expenses. The growth in Medicare expenditures, which pay 
for hospital and physicians’ services, has outstripped general inflation and can- 
not be attributed to demographic change alone. In 1967, its first full year of 
operation, total Medicare expenditures were $4.6 billion. By 1984, Medicare 
expenditures had increased to $62.9 billion (Division of National Cost Esti- 
mates 1987). The annual compound real rate of growth was 9.1 percent, far in 
excess of the growth in the number of Medicare enrollees. Only a small part of 
this growth rate could be explained by  the increasing average age of Medicare 
enrollees. Rapid expenditure growth has continued despite well-publicized and 
controversial cost-containment programs. 
Advocates  of  a greater  role  for public insurance  emphasize that  out-of- 
pocket expenditures for health care among Americans age 65 and older have 
not decreased in real terms since the Medicare program began. There are sev- 
eral explanations for the persistence of substantial out-of-pocket expenditures. 
One is the growth and diffusion of cost-increasing medical technology, which 
may have improved the care delivered to Medicare recipients and certainly has 
increased its cost (Schwartz 1987; Division of National Cost Estimates 1987). 
Because of relatively complete insurance coverage, however, hospital and phy- 
sician services are rarely responsible for catastrophic out-of-pocket expendi- 
tures. Nursing home care and related services, however, can lead to large out- 
of-pocket  costs. Largely  because its  eligibility  rules  are so restrictive, the 
Medicare program pays for relatively little long-term care, which consists of 
nursing home care, home health care, and other services for chronic illnesses 
and disabilities. Only a small fraction of total nursing home care expenditures 
in the United States are reimbursed by the Medicare program. Medicaid spends 
much more for long-term care, paying for about 44 percent of all nursing home 
expenditures in 1987 (Letsch, Levit, and Waldo 1988). However, because it is 
a need-based program, Medicaid is unavailable to middle-class Americans un- 
til they have become impoverished by health expenditures. 
Discussions of long-term care financing usually emphasize institutional care 
because it accounts for the preponderance of long-term care expenditures. In 
1982, for example, when  total  expenditures for nursing  home care in the 
United States were $27 billion, Medicare and Medicaid  together spent less 
than $1.6 billion for home health care. Private expenditures for home health 
care in  1981 were estimated to be $2.3 billion (Doty, Liu, and Wiener 1985). 
While many recognize the need for improved financing of  long-term care, 
opinions about the best solutions diverge. Some groups emphasize the need 
for a greater government role either in the provision of long-term care or in its 
financing. Others, noting the unexpectedly  rapid rise in Medicare expendi- 
tures, argue that it would be preferable to develop private initiatives for long- 
term care. 
In this paper, I briefly describe demographic trends that influence the utiliza- 
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and physicians’ services for the elderly, and discuss obstacles to more compre- 
hensive financing and delivery of long-term care. Cost containment is the cen- 
tral theme of  current discussions about financing hospital and physicians’ ser- 
vices, while  the  issues in  long-term care concern expanding coverage and 
reducing the risk of  catastrophic costs for the elderly who are subject to the 
risk of institutionalization. 
7.1  Demographic Change and Financing Health Care 
Even if prices and the mix of health services do not change, the “graying” 
of the U.S.  population will promote health expenditure growth. Demographic 
changes account for only part of  the recent inflation in health costs, but they 
will have a greater effect in the future. The 12 percent of the U.S. population 
age 65 and older are responsible for more than a third of all health expendi- 
tures. The number of Americans in this age group is expected to double by the 
time all the postwar “baby boom” generation reaches old age. Furthermore, 
among the elderly, health care utilization rises dramatically with age, so projec- 
tions that the number of very old-age  85 and older-will  quadruple in the 
next fifty years (US. Bureau of the Census 1984) suggest that health expendi- 
tures will soar. 
Long-term care is even more closely tied to aging. A negligible fraction of 
the under-65 population reside in nursing homes. Among all individuals age 
65 and older, between 4 and 5 percent will be in a nursing home at any time 
(table 7.1). The likelihood of being in a nursing home rises with age, reaching 
as high as 25 percent for a person who is age 85 or older. Over the past decade 
or so, the age-specific risk of being institutionalized appears to have declined 
slightly, but, even if this trend continues, if all else is equal, the shift in the age 
distribution of  the American population will expand the number of  nursing 
home residents. The effect on utilization of long-term care services, which are 
delivered primarily to the elderly, may even exceed the change in demand for 
physician or hospital care. 
As health service utilization increases, the range of  feasible options for fi- 
nancing care may  become  more limited. When the baby  boom  generation 
reaches older ages, the population that uses health care services and long-term 
care most heavily will grow as the working-age population shrinks. The ratio 
of elderly Medicare enrollees to currently employed adults may rise to 40 per- 
cent-that  is, two retirees for every five workers (U.S.  Senate Special Commit- 
tee on Aging  1986, 21). Thus, even though today’s Medicare budget deficit 
might be funded out of  general revenues, that option will become less viable 
when the number of employed persons as a fraction of retirees shrinks. Politi- 
cal, economic, and demographic trends make it likely that the generation re- 
ceiving the care will pay for it, either during their working years or after they 
have reached advanced age. 178  Alan M. Garber 
Table 7.1  Nursing Home and Personal Care Home Residents 65 Years of Age 
and Over and Rate per 1,000 Population: United States, 1963, 
1973-74,  1977, and 1985 
1963  1973-74  1977  1985 
All ages  25.4  44.7  47.1  46.2 
75-84  years  39.6  57.7  64.0  51.7 
85 years and older  148.4  257.3  225.9  220.3 
65-14  years  7.9  12.3  14.4  12.5 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (1989, 123). 
7.2  Current Financing of  Health Care for the Elderly 
The vast majority of America’s elderly participate in Medicare. The hospital 
insurance component of Medicare, Part A, formerly paid for up to ninety days 
of hospital care per year. The Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI) compo- 
nent, or Medicare Part B, covers physicians’ fees and fees for other profes- 
sional services and supplies. More than 95 percent of elderly Americans partic- 
ipate  in  Part  A,  and  a  similar  number  pay  a  small  monthly  premium  to 
participate in Part B (Health Care Financing Administration  1989). 
At least until recently, about two-thirds of all elderly Americans purchased 
private health insurance to extend or complement their  Medicare coverage. 
Much of  this private insurance, usually called medigap  insurance, paid  for 
some or all of  the deductibles and copayments under Medicare. Many of the 
policies also extended the number of days of coverage for hospital care, nurs- 
ing home care, or both. Relatively few services that were excluded from Medi- 
care benefits, such as prescription drugs and eyeglasses, were covered by medi- 
gap policies. The role of medigap policies is in flux because of the series of 
revisions of the Medicare program that began in 1988 with the passage of the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. 
The Catastrophic Coverage Act contained many of the features of medigap 
insurance policies. The new benefit structure, which was to be implemented in 
a series of steps, would have limited out-of-pocket expenditures for several 
covered services and expanded the services covered by Medicare. The Cata- 
strophic Coverage Act mandated that, as of  1990, Medicare would pay for all 
Part B services in excess of $1,370, After payment of a $560 deductible, Medi- 
care recipients would have unlimited coverage for inpatient hospital care. Prior 
to the passage of this bill, coverage was limited to ninety days of hospitaliza- 
tion, and patients bore a significant coinsurance burden. The catastrophic ill- 
ness benefit was also designed to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures for outpa- 
tient prescription  drugs, which Medicare had not covered previously. As of 
1991, there was to be a $600 deductible for prescription drugs and 50 percent 
copayments. In subsequent years, the copayment rate was to diminish, while a 
flexible deductible was planned, its size depending on the number of Medicare 179  Financing Health Care for Elderly Americans in the 1990s 
beneficiaries who used the drug benefit. The deductible was to be indexed so 
that approximately  16.8 percent of  all Medicare beneficiaries would qualify 
for the drug benefit at any time. Consequently, the deductible would have in- 
creased if pharmaceutical use or prices rose. 
The Catastrophic Coverage Act added little to Medicare’s limited coverage 
of long-term care. Only individuals confined to their homes (“homebound’) 
were to be reimbursed for home health care. Coverage for several routine home 
health care services, such as occupational therapy and part-time  services of 
home health aides, would have been extended only to persons who needed 
part-time skilled nursing care and met all other eligibility conditions. Home- 
maker services, drug administration, and blood transfusions were not covered. 
Although the Catastrophic Coverage Act liberalized some of the rules for 
nursing home coverage under Medicare, the scope of  coverage was not ex- 
panded dramatically. Prior to passage of the Catastrophic Coverage Act, Medi- 
care paid for up to 100 days of nursing home care. The hospital insurance 
component of Medicare paid for all the covered services during the first twenty 
days in a nursing home, leaving a copayment for the twenty-first through the 
100th day of hospital care. Several conditions had to be met, however, before 
a beneficiary could be reimbursed for any nursing home care. Nursing home 
coverage was limited to care in skilled nursing facilities, institutions that pro- 
vide full-time or nearly full-time skilled nursing care. The patient had to be 
transferred to the skilled nursing facility in order to receive care for a condition 
that was treated in a hospital. The hospital admission preceding entry to the 
nursing home had to be at least three days long and had to occur in the thirty 
days prior to the nursing home admission. Admission to the nursing home re- 
quired the approval of both a doctor and a utilization review committee. The 
Catastrophic Coverage Act eliminated the prior hospitalization  requirement 
and raised the limit on nursing home care from 100 to 150 days per year. No 
deductible for skilled nursing care was proposed. 
The Catastrophic  Coverage Act was repealed before  it was fully  imple- 
mented. Controversy over its provisions erupted soon after it was passed. The 
funding mechanism-a  surtax on the income tax of elderly Medicare enroll- 
ees-divided  older Americans. Many of them faced added tax payments far 
exceeding the premiums they formerly paid for private supplemental insurance 
and far in excess of the actuarial value of the added benefits. A Congressional 
Budget Office report estimated that the program’s benefits in 1989 were worth 
$62.00 per enrollee while premiums averaged  $145 and were substantially 
more for high-income Medicare enrollees. For persons subject to the maxi- 
mum surtax (incomes over $35,000), the cost was fourteen times the value of 
the benefits (Tolchin 1989).  Although the pressure for repeal came from people 
who objected to the surtax, others attacked the Catastrophic Coverage Act be- 
cause it failed to extend long-term care coverage. 
In recent years, because it limited eligibility for nursing home reimburse- 
ments and covered only 100 days of nursing home care each year, Medicare 180  Alan M. Garber 
has accounted for a small percentage of the overall payments for nursing home 
care. Of the $40.6 billion spent for nursing home care, Medicare paid for 1.4 
percent in 1987. Private long-term care insurance paid for less than 1 percent. 
The elderly and their families paid for about half of nursing home care. Medic- 
aid paid for just under 44 percent, while other government and private sources 
paid the remainder (see table 7.2). 
Although Medicaid, which is administered jointly by the states and the fed- 
eral government, was designed to provide health insurance to low-income per- 
sons, its “spend-down” provisions have enabled many other Americans who 
have substantial medical or long-term care expenditures to draw on its benefits. 
The rules for Medicaid eligibility vary from state to state, but most state Med- 
icaid  programs  have  an eligibility  category  called  medically  needy.  In  the 
thirty-five states with medically needy programs, persons whose income net of 
health  expenditures falls below  133 percent of the welfare level income are 
said to “spend down” and are eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. In  1984, 
the “allowed resources” or value of assets allowed for two-person households 
under state medically needy programs ranged from $2,250 (in several states) 
to $9,500 (in North Dakota). The allowed income after health expenditures for 
a two-person household ranged from $135 (Tennessee) to $583 (Wisconsin). 
Long stays in nursing homes are expensive-in  1986, it was estimated that 
nursing home care cost an average of $22,000 annually in the United States 
(Bowen 1986). Because the long-term care expenditures of many middle-class 
institutionalized elderly approach or exceed total income,  many are able to 
participate in Medicaid. 
Largely because of its spend-down provision, Medicaid pays nearly half of 
all U.S. nursing home expenditures. The Medicaid benefit has been the source 
of  discontent  among  many  groups  with  disparate  interests  and  opinions. 
Spending down is viewed by the elderly as a disruptive and often humiliating 
experience, discomfiting a group that is already disabled by chronic disease 
and forced to leave home for an institution. In some states, spouses’ assets are 
not protected if an individual enters a nursing home and spends down. Anec- 
Table 7.2  U.S. Aggregate Nursing Home Care Expenditures by Source of 
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dotes are told about elderly couples divorcing in order to preserve the assets of 
the independently living spouse. Yet Medicaid often bears the cost of nursing 
home care for a group of people who were never intended beneficiaries of the 
program. Furthermore,  some people transfer assets prior to the  spend-down 
period in order to escape loss of assets and income. The federal Office of the 
Inspector General claims that millions of dollars are lost to the Medicaid pro- 
gram each year because of lax efforts to recover assets for decedents who re- 
ceived Medicaid benefits.  If  all states recovered  money "owed"  to Medicaid 
by the estates of Medicaid beneficiaries as effectively as Oregon, the state with 
the most effective estate recovery program, $589 million would be collected 
annually, according to the inspector general (Kidwell 1988). 
Private insurance plays a smaller role in  financing the health care of  the 
elderly. Although the role of medigap policies will change in response to gov- 
ernment actions, they are unlikely to begin to provide extensive coverage for 
long-term care. Nevertheless, private insurance has an important potential role 
in long-term care. Long-term care represents a frontier for private health insur- 
ers: although policies have been available for several years, private insurance 
currently pays less than  1 percent of all nursing home expenditures. To know 
why the role of private insurers has been so limited, it is necessary to review 
the characteristics of long-term care and the people who use it. 
7.3  Long-Term Care Utilization and Determinants 
Because the number of disabled elderly is expected to grow over the coming 
years, and because the market for insurance against the financial risks gener- 
ated by nursing home admission is poorly developed, there is substantial inter- 
est in promoting private long-term care insurance and innovative approaches 
to long-term care. Why has private insurance made few inroads into long-term 
care, and why has there been so little innovation in long-term care delivery? 
Many of the elements of demand for insurance are present: to the extent that 
elderly people who have prolonged admissions to nursing homes deplete their 
assets and income, they face financial catastrophe. The risk of institutionaliza- 
tion is small but not negligible. However, efforts to change long-term care fi- 
nancing and delivery have been stymied by our inadequate knowledge of the 
forces leading to nursing home admission, of the characteristics that distin- 
guish individuals who spend long periods in nursing homes from those whose 
nursing home admissions are brief, of the interactions between nursing home 
utilization and hospital utilization, and of the distinctions between those health 
factors associated with high mortality and those that lead to nursing home ad- 
mission. 
Without this kind of information, both insurers and the elderly themselves 
have found it difficult to anticipate the risk of nursing home admission. There 
is even less information about the extent of adverse selection that would be 
faced by a private insurer. Regulatory barriers, uncertainty about future govern- 182  Alan M. Garber 
ment programs directed toward long-term care, and concerns about moral haz- 
ard aggravate these problems. For quite some time, economists have proposed 
that, by raising the demand for health care, health insurance is responsible for 
much of the growth in U.S. medical expenditures in recent decades (Feldstein 
1973). 
In view of the relative underdevelopment of insurance for long-term care, it 
is noteworthy that long-term care expenditures have grown much more slowly 
than expenditures for hospital  and physicians’  services. The experience of 
Medicare is instructive. Medicare expenditures rose from $4.5 billion in  1967 
to $76 billion in  1986 (table 7.3). There is substantial disagreement about its 
causes, but the rapid rise in Medicare expenditures cannot be attributed to the 
rate of inflation in input prices, such as labor, nor can it be attributed to simple 
expansion of  the number of Medicare recipients. Several experts believe that 
much of the growth in expenditures can be attributed to the development and 
dissemination of new health care “technology.” Many new operations and di- 
agnostic procedures had been developed during that period,  and operations 
that were once performed only on middle-aged adults or younger people were 
performed increasingly often on the elderly. For example, in the 1970s, it was 
unusual for elderly Americans to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery. In 
1972, Americans age 65-74  accounted for 8 percent of  all coronary bypass 
operations. By  1981, they accounted for 28 percent of  the procedures. The 
number of  such operations performed  in  this age group rose from 2,500 in 
1972 to 46,000 in  1981. The volume of other major operations performed on 
the elderly also grew during the same period (Valvona and Sloan 1985). 
The circumstance that  most favorably affected the development  of  such 
technology was the widened availability of health insurance, which lowered 
the price to the patient of having an operation or an expensive diagnostic proce- 
dure to the amount of the copayment. No such phenomenon has characterized 
Table 7.3  Medicare Enrollees and Expenditures and Percentage Distribution, 
According to Type of Service: United States, Selected Years, 1967-86 
Type of  Service  1967  1970  1975  1980  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Enrollees4  19.5  20.5  25.0  28.5  30.0  30.5  31.1  31.7 
All expendituresb  4.5  7.1  15.6  35.7  57.4  62.9  70.5  76.0 
All services‘  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Hospital carec  69.1  71.5  73.8  72.6  70.5  70.1  69.3  68.0 
Physician services‘  24.7  22.8  21.6  22.1  23.4  23.3  24.0  25.0 
Othcr health services‘  1.6  1.9  2.8  4.1  5.3  5.7  5.9  6.2 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (1989, 174). 
aMillions. 
hBillions of  dollars. 
‘Percentage distribution of expenditures 
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long-term care. Direct payments by the elderly and their families or fixed, low 
payments by Medicaid account for virtually all expenditures for nursing home 
care. Anecdotal evidence that Medicaid patients face very long waits for ad- 
mission supports the claim that Medicaid reimburses nursing homes less than 
private payers do. Because most full payments are out-of-pocket expenditures, 
and because  Medicaid,  which pays less, is responsible  for most third-party 
expenditures, nursing homes and other providers have had little incentive to 
develop possibly cost-increasing but more attractive long-term care. 
Successful methods to limit utilization of long-term care would allay much 
of the concern that insurers have about long-term care insurance. They would 
still need to know, however, the likelihood that insurance subscribers will use 
long-term care, and they will need accurate predictions of long-term care ex- 
penditures for enrollees. Consequently,  analyses of  the utilization of nursing 
home care, particularly in relation to observable characteristics of the individu- 
als, have become very important. In fact, if  observable characteristics could 
explain a great deal of the variation in nursing home utilization, adverse selec- 
tion might not be a severe problem for insurers. Of course, if insurers possess 
detailed risk information, many elderly men and women would be unable to 
purchase private long-term care insurance at an affordable premium. 
Few  studies have provided  comprehensive estimates or forecasts of  long- 
term care utilization. Many studies have been designed simply to estimate the 
risk that an individual will enter a nursing home during that person’s remaining 
life or during a fixed time interval. Many other studies have examined the dis- 
tribution of length of stay in a nursing home without reference to the probabil- 
ity of  admission. Relatively few of  them have examined the expected future 
utilization  of nursing home care by an individual who currently lives in the 
community. This is the measure of  utilization that is most important for esti- 
mating expenditures on behalf of a potential purchaser of long-term care in- 
surance. 
A full characterization  of  the  demand  for and  supply of  long-term  care 
would be the best basis for anticipating the effect of insurance coverage. How- 
ever, attempts to estimate supply and demand curves for long-term care ser- 
vices have been nearly absent from the literature. Furthermore, nearly all stud- 
ies of long-term care utilization have concentrated on nursing homes, although 
several studies have examined substitution between home health services and 
nursing home utilization. These studies did not, however, attempt to estimate 
price elasticities. The most prominent exception is a paper by Chiswick (1976), 
which combined state- and metropolitan-level  cross-sectional and time-series 
data to analyze nursing home supply and demand. Data and methodological 
limitations cast doubt on the validity of its findings, yet many of the results are 
plausible. The price elasticity of demand for nursing home care was negative, 
and aggregate demand for nursing home care was higher in areas with an older, 
more disabled, and wealthier population. Because the author did not have data 
on such characteristics as the percentage of elderly persons living alone, only 184  Alan M. Garber 
limited conclusions can be drawn about the effect of these correlates of area- 
wide utilization. Particularly because  other authors did not even attempt to 
control for some of the exogenous characteristics that influence the supply of 
nursing home care, such as average wage levels, this study represents a note- 
worthy attempt to characterize the market for nursing home services. 
A number of problems make it difficult to estimate the supply and demand 
for long-term care services. Nursing homes are not homogeneous,  so price 
variation may reflect differences in the services offered. More important, the 
price faced by the elderly person who enters a nursing home may not be ob- 
servable; the price paid for six months of  nursing home care by  an elderly 
person facing spend down is much lower if his or her assets have already been 
depleted. Typically, a middle-class woman who spends down is first a “private 
pay” patient and enters a relatively desirable nursing home with little difficulty. 
She can stay in the nursing home after becoming a Medicaid beneficiary, but, 
if  she is transferred to a hospital for a long admission (perhaps two weeks or 
longer), she may lose her nursing home bed. She must then apply for readmis- 
sion, but, now that she is a Medicaid patient, she is more likely than a private 
pay patient to be rejected. Uncertainty about current and expected assets and 
the subjective probability  distribution  of the duration  of  institutionalization 
make it particularly difficult to infer the price faced by an individual. 
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that other studies of  long-term 
care utilization have had narrower goals: predicting the number of people en- 
tering nursing homes, examining the determinants of nursing home utilization, 
or studying  the  interactions  between  nursing  home and  home health  care. 
Many studies only attempted to predict the probability that a person will enter 
a nursing home during some fixed time interval or during that person’s lifetime. 
Others examined only the duration of nursing home admissions. Finally, some 
studies used comprehensive measures of utilization, estimating the distribution 
of expected nursing home utilization for various groups of older people living 
in the community. Within this group are several studies that also attempt to 
examine interactions between home health care and nursing home utilization 
as well as the interactions between hospital and nursing home care. 
Several studies (Shapiro and Webster 1984; Shapiro and Tate 1988; Cohen, 
Tell, and Wallack 1988; Greenburg and Ginn 1979; Branch and Jette 1982; and 
Lane et al. 1985) have examined the risk of admission to a nursing home in a 
fixed period. Others estimated the number of people who will be admitted to 
a nursing home at any time in their life (Palmore 1976; Vicente, Wiley,  and 
Carrington  1979; McConnel  1984; and  Cohen, Tell, and  Wallack  1986b). 
These studies  are a heterogeneous  group, examining different populations, 
applying different statistical methods, predicting different aspects of utiliza- 
tion, and controlling for different underlying sources of variation in utilization. 
Consequently, estimates of the likelihood of admission to a nursing home vary 
greatly. However, the best estimate of  the probability that a 65-year-old will 
later enter a nursing home is approximately 25 percent. 185  Financing Health Care for Elderly Americans in the 1990s 
Several characteristics have been found to be consistently associated with 
the risk of institutionalization.  Chief among these are advanced age, female 
gender, the presence  of  certain health conditions, severe functional impair- 
ments, and living alone. Those who receive Medicaid are more likely to enter 
nursing homes, while some studies, but not all, find that more wealthy people 
are less likely to enter nursing homes (Garber and MaCurdy 1989). 
Few studies have attempted to forecast overall nursing home utilization. The 
studies of  overall utilization  that were not conducted  as part of a trial of a 
health intervention include those by Manheim and Hughes (1986) and Cohen, 
Tell, and Wallack (1986a). There have been several investigations of the effects 
of community care interventions on nursing home utilization, but many did not 
have an appropriate control group, nor did they control for relevant characteris- 
tics of the participants. Others studied populations that may not be representa- 
tive of the general U.S. population of elderly (Weissert 1985). Community care 
demonstrations directed toward preventing nursing home admission have been 
reviewed by  Kemper, Applebaum, and Harrigan  (1987). For the most part, 
these demonstrations  have tested whether enriched sets of  home health ser- 
vices and other community services could obviate admission to nursing homes. 
One  national  randomized  controlled  trial,  the  National  Long-Term  Care 
(“Channeling”) Demonstration, has tested whether enhanced home health ser- 
vices can prevent nursing home admission and decrease long-term care expen- 
ditures. This study, which was sponsored by  the Department of Health and 
Human Services, selected a group of very disabled elderly people who were 
predominantly  poor, relatively old, and lacking in social supports (Kemper 
1988). More than half of the Channeling participants were incontinent, and 84 
percent were disabled in at least one activity of daily living. The intervention 
was case management, or the assignment of  an individual, usually a social 
worker, to coordinate and help obtain care for Channeling participants (Phil- 
lips, Kemper, and Applebaum 1988). Although the enrollees who received the 
intervention obtained more home health services, their outcomes were not im- 
proved by the intervention. Furthermore, overall costs in the intervention group 
were  somewhat higher than  in the control group  (Thornton,  Dunstan,  and 
Kemper 1988). During the first year of the randomized trial, participants who 
received  the  intervention  spent an  average of  twenty-five days  in  nursing 
homes, while control group utilization averaged twenty-nine days. Increased 
use of home services offset the slightly lower expenditures for nursing home 
care. The use of hospitals  and physicians’  services was unaffected  by  case 
management (Wooldridge and Schore 1988).  Nursing home utilization was no 
higher than expected for other persons of the same age, but mortality rates in 
both the treatment and the control groups were very high (nearly a third of the 
participants died within a year of enrollment), and it is possible that nursing 
home utilization would have been greater in a disabled but less sickly group of 
elderly (Garber and MaCurdy 1989). 
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suggest that social factors play an important part. These factors, which are not 
as easily quantified as a laboratory test or a physical characteristic, pose prob- 
lems for third-party payers who reimburse long-term care. In view of the chal- 
lenges posed by long-term care, we next turn to the solutions that are currently 
being evaluated or marketed. 
7.4  New Approaches to Private Financing of Long-Term Care 
The slow development and adoption of long-term care insurance reflects the 
unique characteristics of long-term care. There can be little doubt that insurers 
were slow to develop and market insurance for long-term care because they 
feared  that  adverse  selection,  moral  hazard,  and  demographic  uncertainty 
would be serious obstacles. In many respects, the informational asymmetries 
and inefficiencies that have characterized health care insurance are likely to be 
magnified in the case of long-term care. As a result, thin coverage and rigorous 
exclusions have characterized most of the policies offered. 
Perhaps the most important barrier to the development of either private long- 
term care insurance or capitated health care plans is adverse selection. Poverty, 
lack of social supports, and functional disability are important risk factors for 
institutionalization. While  insurance companies may partially  observe these 
characteristics, the purchaser knows a great deal more about the beneficiary’s 
health status and level of function. Any party that indemnifies, reimburses ser- 
vices, or directly provides care faces these same problems. If the insurer or 
provider had sufficient information about the functional status and social sup- 
ports of elderly people, reluctance to provide insurance might diminish. 
Protection  against adverse selection takes many  forms. For example, the 
premiums for private long-term care insurance rise rapidly with the age at en- 
rollment. Presumably a woman at age 40 or 50 has little information about her 
future risk of nursing home admission, relative to others at the same age. At 
age 70, she is much more likely than the insurer to know whether she is partic- 
ularly  likely  (or unlikely) to enter a nursing home. Other methods to deter 
adverse selection are the imposition of waiting periods before benefits can be 
collected and the exclusion of preexisting conditions or particular conditions 
that are very common among nursing home residents, such as dementia. Of 
course, while narrow coverage and multiple exclusions may deter adverse se- 
lection, they diminish insurance coverage for all enrollees and compromise the 
desirability of the long-term care insurance package. Thus, it is not surprising 
that few policies with highly restrictive benefits have been sold. 
Moral hazard may have a greater effect on long-term care utilization  than 
on hospital or physicians’ services. In health care, the presence of moral hazard 
means simply that there is a price effect-that  insurance that pays a substantial 
fraction of the cost of medical care will increase the quantity demanded. It is 
no longer tenable to hold that the demand for hospital and physicians’ services 
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patients. There is no obvious standard for either the quantity or the quality of 
care “needed.”  Even if  the demand for care were inelastic in the  short run, 
long-run expenditures for treating specific conditions can rise because of the 
adoption and diffusion of  more costly new medical technology or the wider 
application of existing technology. Thus, as the price to the consumer (the co- 
payment) falls, the quantity demanded rises, and the long-run effects are likely 
to be magnified by technological change. 
Demand for long-term care is likely, in the long run, to be highly sensitive 
to price because there are substitutes for the housing and many of the service 
components of nursing home care. Food, homemaking, and other personal ser- 
vices are potentially desirable to any elderly person, whether disabled or not. 
The likelihood that these services will be “overused” is great. Even large co- 
payments and deductibles are unlikely to eliminate what is perceived as inap- 
propriate use of these services. Thus, insurers and care providers often allocate 
these services by using a rationing mechanism based on screening examina- 
tions, which determine “need” for long-term care, rather than price. The ability 
to evaluate the need  for long-term care services is at a primitive  stage and 
relies heavily on subjective reports by the family and the enrollee, who have 
an obvious incentive  to obscure disabilities when  seeking to buy insurance 
and to emphasize impairments when they seek reimbursement. For many acute 
medical services, laboratory tests and other measures that are less subject to 
direct manipulation by the enrollee are available. Thus, moral hazard is likely 
to remain a significant challenge to any form of prepayment or insurance for 
long-term care. 
Uncertainty about the length of life and trends in the disability of  elderly 
persons further complicate long-term care financing. There is little information 
about changes in average morbidity over time among elderly Americans and 
the resulting changes in expected utilization of long-term care services. Usu- 
ally, long-term care insurance plans allow individuals to pay fixed premiums 
that vary with the age of initial enrollment. If the elderly live longer but age- 
specific levels of disability do not diminish, insurers who charge a fixed pre- 
mium will face unexpected  liabilities. Furthermore, if spouses and children 
provide less care for disabled elderly in the future, the demand for paid long- 
term care services will grow. However, the demographic uncertainty is likely 
to become less important as information about the determinants and magnitude 
of long-term care utilization improves. 
Uncertainty regarding government action is another potential deterrent. Will 
new government policies obviate the need for private long-term care insurance 
or other private financing mechanisms? If this is an important reason for the 
reluctance of elderly Americans to purchase long-term care insurance, it is one 
that some insurers have already addressed. Some plans have arrangements to 
refund premiums if government policy creates insurance with similar coverage 
for all elderly Americans. 
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financing long-term care have addressed these problems in several ways. Re- 
ducing the insurer’s risk means, however, increasing the risk faced by the in- 
sured or denying coverage to many potential enrollees. There is every reason 
to believe that insurers and providers will refine their ability to assess enrollee 
risk as they gain more experience with long-term care insurance and as new 
findings emerge from research on predictors of institutionalization. 
Despite the remaining challenges, private long-term care insurance is be- 
coming an important component of long-term care financing. The Health In- 
surance Association of America reported that, in 1988, the number of compa- 
nies selling long-term care insurance was six times the number in  1984. By 
December 1988, an estimated 1.1 million policies had been sold. It seems clear 
that broader coverage promoted expansion in the market for long-term care 
insurance. Plans introduced in 1988 and later tended to eliminate prior hospi- 
talization requirements for nursing home admission and to provide benefits for 
a longer period. Furthermore, exclusions for such conditions as Alzheimer’s 
disease and for preexisting conditions became less common. A greater propor- 
tion of  policies guaranteed  renewability  (Van Gelder and Johnson  1989). It 
seems likely that private long-term care insurance, which was unattractive to 
purchasers because it formerly paid benefits only under a restrictive set of cir- 
cumstances, will become an increasingly important means of financing nursing 
home care in the next decade. 
Nevertheless, private insurance may not finance all or most long-term care 
in the coming  years. Long-term care insurance is likely  to be affordable if 
purchased during working years, so private insurance could have an expanded 
role by the time baby boomers have aged. According to simulation estimates 
from the Brookings-ICF long-term care financing model, about 58 percent of 
all elderly early in the next century will be covered by private long-term care 
insurance purchased during working years. Insurance purchased after retire- 
ment will cover fewer people (Rubin, Wiener, and Meiners 1989). Private in- 
surance, unless subsidized, is also unlikely to finance care for low-income, 
high-risk men and women, like many Medicaid enrollees. 
Attention to private long-term care insurance is complemented by interest 
in  social  health  maintenance  organizations  and  continuing-care  retirement 
communities or life-care communities. Social HMOs extend the concept of a 
prepaid capitated health care plan to provision of long-term care services. Like 
conventional HMOs, social HMOs typically rely on fixed annual payments to 
give providers an incentive to limit the quantity of services delivered. Prelimi- 
nary results from a nationwide demonstration of  social HMOs indicate that 
this form of care, which seeks to diminish costs by placing the health care 
provider at risk for any costs arising from care of the subscribers, may not be 
profitable. Although the reasons for the lack of success of the demonstration 
social HMOs is unclear, unexpectedly low enrollment is a major contributing 
factor. 
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health services, are also becoming popular. Their characteristics vary greatly 
from one state to another because they are subject to state regulation. These 
communities, which often provide long-term care services to their members, 
frequently self-insure. Nursing homes are sometimes on the campus of these 
communities, although nursing home care is often provided off premise under 
contractual arrangements. The fees for joining these communities vary greatly. 
Typically, there is a large initial payment for the purchase of a condominium 
in the life-care community, with additional monthly fees. For life-care commu- 
nities that insure or provide long-term care services, the incentives and risks 
are the same as for social HMOs: because they bear the financial risk for any 
nursing home care or other costly long-term care required by its members, they 
have an incentive to underprovide such care. 
Federal agencies and Congress have discussed several other options for gov- 
ernment financing of long-term care. One of the options is expansion of Medi- 
care benefits so that reimbursement for long-term care would parallel coverage 
under Medicaid but would be extended to all elderly Americans (Blumenthal 
et al. 1986).  Financing such a program would likely prove contentious. It might 
be much more costly than the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act coverage; 
younger Americans would resist paying more for health care for the elderly, 
and older Americans who would bear the cost of a surtax would object even 
more strongly. As an alternative, the Reagan administration had discussed the 
feasibility  of  utilizing tax-deferred  saving vehicles  to induce individuals to 
save money for possible catastrophic health care or long-term care costs. The 
tax-saving vehicle, called an individual medical account (IMA), has not pro- 
gressed far in legislative debates or within the Department of Health and Hu- 
man Services. The drawbacks, according to several critics, are that participa- 
tion would be lower than for IRAs, that participation in the IRA program was 
limited, and that such a program would favor the wealthy. Thus, the IMAs are 
viewed as a potential tool to help a small minority of elderly Americans at risk 
of long-term care pay for their future long-term care services. 
Other saving devices might diminish the need for long-term care insurance 
if the elderly had enough liquid assets at the time they needed long-term care. 
One alternative would enable the elderly to convert their main asset, the homes 
that many of them own, into liquid wealth. Reverse annuity mortgages are one 
means of converting housing wealth into cash, without selling or leaving one’s 
residence, but thus far few elderly persons have participated in the programs. 
It remains to be seen whether these or other mechanisms to convert assets will 
contribute substantially to long-term care financing; however, according to a 
report from the Brookings Institution based  on a simulation model, because 
many of the elderly have substantial home equity, equity conversions could be 
a valuable source of funds to pay  for long-term care insurance (Rivlin  and 
Wiener 1988). 
Moral hazard is likely to remain a significant challenge for long-term care 
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for limiting utilization of free or heavily subsidized long-term care services, 
and while (acute) health care services have long been a testing ground for plans 
to limit moral hazard, there is far less experience in long-term care. Functional 
status testing, as noted above, can be used to determine eligibility for benefits. 
Large copayments and deductibles can limit service use by providing less than 
full indemnification for costs of long-term care. Of course, such mechanisms 
are likely to be less than fully effective, and they limit the extent of insurance. 
Insurers may explore other mechanisms for limiting their costs, such as con- 
tracting with nursing homes directly. They have taken a similar approach to 
hospital and physicians’ services, and, while there is little evidence that con- 
tracting (with “preferred providers”) limits utilization, it may limit expendi- 
tures inasmuch as it lowers the price that insurers pay. However, none of these 
solutions has eliminated  the effect of moral hazard  in the market for physi- 
cians’ and hospital services. Partly because HMOs have been more successful 
than conventional fee-for-service plans in this regard, the conventional wisdom 
is that provider incentives are a key component of successful efforts to control 
moral hazard. 
Another way to limit utilization, and to ensure appropriate utilization, is case 
management.  Case management,  such as the intervention in the Channeling 
demonstration, means that a professional is designated to coordinate the deliv- 
ery of long-term care services to an elderly disabled individual. The motivation 
for such an approach is the hope that, with adequate provision of home health 
care and related  services, people who are otherwise likely to enter nursing 
homes will not do so. Furthermore, case management might deter inappropri- 
ate utilization of long-term care services generally. Unfortunately, the evidence 
that  such an intervention  would lower nursing  home utilization  or costs of 
long-term care is at best mixed, as noted above. Consequently, while case man- 
agement appears to be a sensible approach to improving long-term care deliv- 
ery, and while it could be applied with either public or private insurance, there 
is little evidence that it will  help  insurers  or capitated  health  plans  reduce 
their risk. 
7.5  Concluding Comments 
Because demographic factors will increase demand for both long-term care 
and conventional medical services, financing the health care of the elderly is 
sure to remain an important issue in the United States throughout the coming 
decades. Like other forms of insurance, long-term care insurance should pro- 
tect subscribers from the risk of catastrophic expenditures, but moral hazard 
and adverse selection may render comprehensive coverage unprofitable. Will 
these considerations lead to greater federal involvement in long-term care fi- 
nancing? Are private financing mechanisms likely to overcome these obstacles 
and play a larger role in the future? 
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voters are understandably reluctant to add long-term care to federal expendi- 
tures for health care. Efforts to contain Medicare expenditures have had mixed 
success;  in the  1980s, when  prospective  payment  dampened the  growth  in 
Medicare’s hospital expenditures, physicians’ payments rose sharply. The con- 
sequences of expanded government financing of long-term care are unknown, 
but there are many reasons to be cautious. Because expenditures for long-term 
care costs may be more difficult to control than expenditures for hospital and 
physicians’ services, legislators may be reluctant to augment benefits for nurs- 
ing homes and home health care. Medicaid does pay for a substantial fraction 
of long-term care, but it is not an attractive model for future financing. Private 
approaches to financing and delivering long-term care seem to be a more viable 
first step. 
Many of the elderly will be unable to purchase private long-term care insur- 
ance because they have manifest disabilities. In the longer run, marketing long- 
term care insurance to younger persons should help prevent adverse selection. 
That is one reason why private long-term care insurance is expected to play a 
larger role in the future and a larger fraction of the elderly will be protected 
from the costs of long-term care. However, moral hazard will remain an ob- 
stacle to the efficient functioning of a long-term care insurance market. In or- 
der to make sure that costs do not rise as rapidly as the costs of conventional 
health insurance, payers will need to adopt a more deliberate approach to eval- 
uating  new forms of  long-term care. Medical  treatments  have been  adopted 
and widely disseminated before their benefits were tested. In many cases, they 
were later found to be ineffective. Because pharmaceutical companies, equip- 
ment manufacturers, and care providers had an incentive to provide innovative 
care and patients bore little of the cost themselves, new technology has become 
synonymous with increased costs. At least in the near term, insurance is not 
likely to induce major technological  innovations in  long-term  care. But the 
major components of  long-term  care include housing  and food services. As 
large numbers of people purchase long-term care insurance, nursing homes are 
likely to change their character, many of them providing higher-quality hous- 
ing and related services. Many individuals who would not consider entering a 
nursing home today would be willing to do so if quality improved in this sense. 
Unless insurers learn to allocate long-term  care services by  criteria that are 
judged as fair and acceptable to enrollees, the costs of long-term care insurance 
could grow as rapidly as the costs of conventional health insurance. 
An alternative approach would emphasize the prevention of the disabilities 
that lead persons to seek long-term care. Some (e.g., Somers 1984) have ar- 
gued that well-placed efforts to prevent chronic disability might be effective. 
If the disabilities due to the chronic syndromes and diseases that lead to the 
heavy use of long-term care services-such  as dementia, heart disease, muscu- 
loskeletal disease, stroke, and urinary and fecal incontinence-can  be reduced, 
the demand for long-term care might well diminish. 
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cantly diminish the morbidity of these conditions. The specific cause of Alz- 
heimer’s disease, the most common  form of  dementia in the elderly, is un- 
known, and it cannot be prevented  or effectively  treated. One can be more 
sanguine  about  other  illnesses.  Medications  that  prevent  heart  attacks  and 
stroke by  lowering  cholesterol and by  lowering elevated blood pressure are 
available. The overall mortality rates from cardiovascular disease in the United 
States have fallen in recent years. However, the reduction in coronary heart 
disease  that  results  from  either  cholesterol  reduction  or the  lowering  of  a 
mildly elevated blood pressure (the most common form of high blood pressure) 
is modest. While there are treatments that effectively relieve some of the symp- 
toms of arthritis and other forms of musculoskeletal disease, most forms can 
be neither prevented nor cured. In  fact, there are few data available to deter- 
mine whether age-adjusted disability levels among the elderly in the United 
States have fallen in recent years. While there is some evidence that there may 
have been a modest reduction in age-adjusted disability (Fries 1980; Palmore 
1986; Poterba and Summers 1987), it is unlikely that future reductions in dis- 
ability will offset the growing number of elderly who are at risk for developing 
disability (Verbrugge 1984). Thus, it is doubtful that either prevention or new 
developments in the treatment of disabling conditions will substantially dimin- 
ish the need for long-term care within the next two decades. 
Because Americans will continue to be subject to the risk of developing the 
health impairments that make long-term care necessary, long-term care financ- 
ing will remain an important policy issue. No simple change in long-term care 
financing  will  satisfy  the  desire  for complete  coverage without  leading  to 
“overutilization,” particularly because moral hazard will remain an important 
obstacle for both public and private insurance. Insurers have entered the market 
for long-term care insurance cautiously, well aware of these problems and of 
the cost inflation that has plagued health insurance during the past thirty years. 
Along with the private insurers, the government  will play a large role in fi- 
nancing long-term care, as a regulator and as a payer. Although the mix will 
change, a combination of public and private sources will almost surely con- 
tinue to finance long-term care. Recent experience suggests, however, that any 
program that increases net governmental outlays will meet with resistance and 
that private financing mechanisms will pay for a growing fraction of long-term 
care. Furthermore, because transfers across generations will not pay for long- 
term care indefinitely, funding for both publicly and privately financed long- 
term care will ultimately  come from savings: enforced  savings (taxation or 
mandatory program participation), tax-favored  voluntary  savings, and insur- 
ance premium payments that have a large savings component. 
Perhaps  a technological breakthrough  will  someday obviate the need for 
long-term care by preventing the chronic diseases associated with institutional- 
ization. Until such a solution becomes available, the mode of financing long- 
term care will have a profound effect on the well-being of elderly Americans. 193  Financing Health Care for Elderly Americans in the 1990s 
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